Why Yemen’s Ports Matter to You – September 2023

On August 6^th, more than 3,000 U.S. sailors and marines reached the Red Sea, traveling through the Suez Canal on board the assault ship USS Bataan to patrol the Western coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Their arrival was part of a preannounced deployment in response to Iran’s harassment and seizures of merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz—the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf that lies along the Arabian Peninsula’s eastern coast. Iran began seizing ships in the Strait of Hormuz in 2019,[1] and since 2021 has targeted 20 commercial vessels in the vicinity.[2] While the deployment of the USS Bataan is meant to deter Iran’s destabilizing activity, it should also serve to highlight the vital importance of Yemen’s coastlines and ports to critical global trade—which is also a significant driver of the interventions in Yemen’s conflict that began in 2015.

For many in the West, ignoring the news about Yemen’s war comes easily. The war in Ukraine is being fought closer to home and its potential to impact their daily lives is more apparent than a conflict in a far away, ancient corner of the Arabian Peninsula. However, those who consider Yemen irrelevant to Western life have made the mistake of ignoring the geographical significance of this cradle of civilization—which is responsible for the safe passage of roughly 10 percent of the world’s oil exports and total global trade estimated at $700 billion USD a year.[3] Perched at the axis of East-West and North-South long-distance shipping, insecurity in and around Yemen’s coastal waters can have a direct impact on the prices consumers pay for goods worldwide. Of course, this reality is not lost on Yemen’s Arabian Peninsula neighbors—who have significant maritime interests in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.[4] Control of Yemen’s coastlines offers an opportunity for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—who are both seeking to position themselves as economic, touristic, and logistical hubs—to both bypass Iran’s shadow in the Strait of Hormuz, as well as to assert themselves as a partner that China must work with to advance its massive Belt and Road Initiative in and around the Horn of Africa.[5] This motivated both countries’ initial intervention in Yemen’s conflict as they attempted to prevent what could amount to maritime disaster for the Arabian Peninsula powers—Yemen’s ports and coastlines controlled by Iran-backed Houthi militias. The specter of being hemmed in between Iranian forces in the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian proxies at the gateway to the Red Sea has now kept both countries enmeshed in Yemen’s protracted conflict for more than eight years—all the while supported by Western allies eager to stop Iran from exploiting the maritime needs of global markets for its own interests.

Today, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have largely given up hope of dislodging the Houthis from Yemen’s north, where they currently govern 70 to 80 percent of Yemen’s population—but just one major port. The Houthis have held the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, the smaller port of Salif, and the Ras Issa oil terminal since 2015. Handling 70 percent of all imports, these three ports in Hodeidah province are critical and irreplaceable to commercial and humanitarian activities inside Yemen[6]—but they represent an acceptable concession for the Houthis’ Arabian Peninsula adversaries. As competing allies, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are now finding themselves increasingly at odds as they scrap over Yemen’s other coastlines and ports by proxy—deepening divisions within the fragmented nation and dimming hopes for a comprehensive peace. In light of their strategic importance today, the following overview provides a glimpse of both the current and historic significance of Yemen’s ports on the international stage.

Situated in the crater of a dormant volcano, the Port of Aden is Yemen’s largest port and one of the largest, deep water, natural harbors in the world. It pinpoints the northwestern most corner of the Indian Ocean and lies approximately 170 km east of the Bab Al Mandeb strait—the southern mouth of the Red Sea through which some 4 million barrels of oil are funneled on a daily basis on the way to Europe.[7] This gateway harbor was first used by the ancient Kingdom of Aswan between the 5^th and 7^th centuries BC.[8] In modern times, Aden grew as ship fueling port during the 1800s, holding stocks of coal and water supplies for early steamers. Port services expanded after the Suez Canal opened in 1869 and by the 1950’s it was the second busiest harbor in the world after New York—emerging as a successful middle distance bunkering point between Europe, the Indian sub-continent, and the far east.[9] In 2006, the port operator Dubai Ports World (DP World) entered into a joint venture with the state-owned Yemen Gulf of Aden Ports Company to manage the harbor. That venture would be canceled in 2012 by Yemen’s interim government led by Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi in the wake of Yemen’s Arab Spring revolution. Hadi’s association with Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islah party put him at odds with the UAE, although the UAE did join the Saudi-Led Coalition (SLC) formed in 2015 to restore Hadi’s government to power after the Houthis drove him from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. However, by 2018 as the coalition’s counter-offensive lost momentum and Islah’s influence on Hadi’s government became more apparent, the UAE began to diverge from its coalition allies and advance its own interests by aiming to control Yemen’s southern coastline and shipping lanes through a “string of ports” strategy. The UAE has sought to implement this strategy through its Yemeni proxies within the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) who took control of Aden in August 2019—hoping to see the city become the capital of an independent south Yemen. Afterwards the separatists also seized maritime installations in Yemen’s Abyan and Shabwa provinces—adding new beads to the UAE’s string of Arabian Sea ports.[10]

In Abyan, the UAE and STC maintain control of the ports at Zinjibar, the capital of the province, as well as Shuqrah. Meanwhile, in Shabwa, they control of the oil ports of Al-Nashima and Qana as well as Yemen’s only Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) terminal at Balhaf. Qana, also known as Bir Ali, was mentioned in ancient Greek and Latin sources as a main port of the Hadramawt kingdom, from which incense, frankincense, the spices of India, ebony, silk and other fine textiles, and East African goods were transported by road to Mediterranean countries on the track that later came to be known as “the gold and incense road.” The trip from Qana on the Indian Ocean to Ghaza on the Mediterranean Sea was said to take 60 to 70 days.[11] Qana was also said to be one of the best ports on the Arabian Peninsula for ships to find safe harbor from the annual southwestern monsoon, which lasts from June to September. Meanwhile, the Balhaf terminal, which began exporting natural gas in 2009, lies near the old fishing port of Burum—separated from Bir Ali by palm trees and white sand that give way to fields of black lava. The Balhaf oasis and the Burum coastal area are recorded in UNESCO’s tentative list for both the natural and cultural values of the area.[12] This site was chosen for the LNG terminal because it presented the lowest risk of earthquakes as well as a high degree of protection and shelter from the wind and waves of the annual monsoon. The terminal is linked to rich gas fields in Yemen’s Marib basin by a 322-kilometer overland pipeline.[13] Although the UAE occupies these Shabwa ports through the STC on the ground, the Houthis attacked both Al-Nashima and Qana with explosive drones in October 2022[14]—effectively shutting them down to oil exports.

Further to the east, the UAE has also managed to control the coast of Yemen’s Hadramawt province by backing the Hadrami Elite Forces—adding the beads of Mukalla and Al Shihr to its string of ports, while Saudi Arabia maintains control of the province’s inland regions.[15] Hadramawt’s ports lie along an infertile but strategically critical strip of Yemen’s southern coast. In ancient times, control of Hadrami ports to a large degree regulated trade between India, the Mediterranean, Arabia, and East Africa. Thus, the Hadramis developed expertise as merchants and sailors, using oceanic routes that generally involved hugging the coastline. Hadrami vessels were sailing ships built from wood purchased in India, and each village port maintained a distinctive style of construction. An archeological site at the medieval Hadrami trading port of Al Sharma is said to possess the richest assortment of Chinese ceramics from its period in the Islamic world. European powers began to intrude on the Hadrami’s domain at the end of the 15^th century with the expansion of first mercantile and then industrial capitalism. Since the Hadrami’s identity as traders was linked more to the maintenance of ancestral tradition than to the concept of a nation state, their relationships with European powers tended to be ambivalent and their loyalty shifted in accordance with their perceived interests. Although the Hadrami’s remained powerless militarily, they succeeded by exploiting European rivalry to their own advantage in ventures abroad. Many grew wealthy via politically powerless but commercially important mercenary and financial enterprises from East Africa to China and used their wealth to finance factional disputes in their homeland. By the 19^th century, the British had gained dominance over the Indian Ocean and the Hadramis benefitted from the vast free trade area this created. Hadrami traders kept sailing their wind-borne vessels even after the advent of steamships—which generally maintained long distance trans-oceanic routes linking major ports while the Hadramis serviced the smaller ports of the Indian Ocean.[16]

Today, the Port of Mukalla is Yemen’s largest seaport on the Arabian sea. It anchors the capital of Hadramawt, the nation’s fifth largest city, which shares the port’s name—derived from linguistic origins meaning a harbor for ships that take shelter from the wind. Mukalla’s current port was opened in January 1985 in the Khalaf area as a multi-purpose port serving eastern Yemen’s commercial, fish, and oil products.[17] On April 2^nd, 2015, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) seized Mukalla and held it for 387 days, initially implementing what Elizabeth Kendall, a scholar at Oxford University called a “Robin Hood strategy.” They played up local connections and tried to use competence and cash to alleviate local grievances without immediately imposing its own brand of religious rule. This won some hearts and minds—or at least acceptance—until a U.S. drone strike killed the group’s leader at the time, Nasir Al-Wuhayshi, on June 12^th, 2015. After that the group began to insist on the observance of increasingly harsh interpretations of Islamic law while evidence of corruption grew. By the time Saudi Arabia and the UAE negotiated the group’s withdrawal from the city on April 24^th, 2016, residents of Mukalla were glad to see them go.[18] However, now, after seven years of economic stagnation imposed by the SLC, some Hadramis are remembering AQAP’s rule in a different light. “They maximized the port’s operations, which brought in a lot of revenue,” says one Hadramawt resident. “However, since they were expelled, and the Saudis and Emiratis took control of the ports and airports there have been no real strategic infrastructure or development projects. Security is much stronger here than in other provinces—especially along our coast—and because of that there should be some projects and work here. But instead, the middle class, which represented 85 percent of the population, has mostly disappeared while Saudi Arabia and the Emirates control all areas of trade including real estate, private hospitals, private schools and universities, as well as other private projects. There is a lot of frustration and hopelessness among the people.”

That frustration has heightened even more since October 2022, when the port of Mukalla closed briefly after local authorities detected Houthi drones in the area. Since then, it has reopened only for non-oil commercial activities.[19] Meanwhile, over the same period AQAP’s activity has increased in Yemen’s southern governorates. As the group looks to exploit local grievances once again, Kendall told Arab Digest that they may also be planning a maritime attack—stating that the sea is currently the only high impact international target left within AQAP’s practical reach. “They know the effect of such an attack,” she said. “It would be worldwide media attention. It would disrupt international shipping, and right now it would spike the oil price at a time when the West is already hurting with the high oil price—so there’s a lot going for an attack like this in their minds.”[20]

Just 15 kilometers to the east of Mukalla, the port of Al Shihr was known as Hadramawt’s gateway to the Indian Ocean from the 10^th Century to the 19^th Century—serving as a major port on the incense trade route. In 1993, the Al Dhabba oil terminal was established at Al Shihr as a key oil port following the discovery of crude oil in Hadramawt’s Masila basin, which is home to 80 percent of Yemen’s known oil reserves. In October of 2022, the terminal was exporting just under 35,000 barrels of crude oil per day when Houthi militias launched armed drones against it.[21] The attack came just as a Greek-owned oil tanker was preparing to dock and load two million barrels of crude oil. Although there was no damage to the port or the tanker, the Houthis said they carried out the warning attack to prevent the vessel from “smuggling” crude oil from the port—effectively shutting down oil exports from Al Shihr ever since, as with the Houthis’ attacks on Al Nashima, Qana, and Mukalla.[22]

Departing from Yemen’s mainland, the UAE has also established a foothold at Hawlaf port on the Yemeni island of Socotra, which lies in the heart of the Arabian Sea’s shipping corridor, 240 kilometers east of the Horn of Africa and 380 kilometers south of Yemen.[23] Some consider the UAE’s attempt to occupy the island in 2018 as the most brazen and telling example of the Emirati’s strategy to monopolize military and commercial control of the entire Gulf of Aden. After several years of providing social services, establishing direct flights to Abu Dhabi, training soldiers, and even flying the Emirati flag—Emirati soldiers arrived on the island in April of 2018 with tanks and armored vehicles and asserted control of Socotra’s air and seaports, dismissing local administrators. However, in the face of angry reactions from locals as well as international pressure, most of the UAE forces later withdrew.[24] The UAE also reportedly build an airbase on Mayyun,[25] a small volcanic island belonging to Yemen that commands a key position in the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.[26] Mayyun’s sheltered natural harbor and strategic location were bypassed by most of recorded history because the waterless island could not easily sustain life. However, in 1857 the British formally seized the island and administered its transformation into a hub of maritime activity until 1967 when it became a part of the People’s Republic of South Yemen.[27]

While the UAE has had some success in securing beads for its string of ports along Yemen’s southern coast, Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain its grasp there only on the lone port of Nishtun, located in Yemen’s eastern most province of the Mahra. The Saudis are hoping to build an oil pipeline to Nishtun, giving them a direct outlet on the Arabian Sea to export oil—bypassing both the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. The Mahra is also home to the medieval ports of Qashin and Khelfoot, which were to be developed for exporting minerals as of 2009,[28] however Yemen’s instability since then has kept those plans from moving forward.

Saudi Arabia’s inability to maintain a grip on Yemen’s southern rim, due in part to the weakening of its proxies in Yemen’s Islah party, has led it to focus its maritime strategy and interests on the fractured nation’s western coast. In July 2019, the UAE handed over control of several Red Sea military bases, including the ports of Mukha and Khokha, to Saudi forces. Lying 75 kilometers north of the Bab Al Mandab straight, Mukha’s importance as a port began in the 16^th century, when Ottoman law required all ships entering the Red Sea to put in at Mukha and pay duty on their cargoes. During its zenith in the 17^th century, English, Dutch, and French companies maintained factories at Mukha and it would remain the principal port for Sana’a, until Aden and Hodeidah eclipsed it in the 19^th century. Long known for its coffee trade, the port of Mukha gave its name to Mocha coffee and even after other sources of coffee were found, Mocha beans continued to be prized for their distinctive flavor and remain so even today. At the 2023 Best of Yemen auction, the top lot of coffee sold for $444 USD per pound, breaking all price records for the Cup of Excellence[29] auction program.[30] However, while Yemeni coffee beans can still fetch top dollar, the port of Mukha no longer has a role in major trade, and the local economy is largely based on fishing.[31] Thus, Saudi interests in both Mukha and Khokha are primarily associated with their respective proximity to the Bab Al Mandeb strait and the Houthi-held port of Hodeidah. Saudi Arabia also maintains control of Yemen’s northern most port of Midi, located in Hajjah province. Midi residents say that its beach, parks, hotels, and restaurants bustled with visitors from all Yemeni provinces throughout the year before the Houthis began using the port to supply weapons to Sana’a and launch missiles against Saudi Arabian villages at the start of Yemen’s war in 2015. For the next three years Midi’s tourist facilities including chalets, swimming pools, and roads were pummeled in a back and forth battle between the Houthis and SLC-backed forces[32] until the Houthis were decisively expelled in April of 2018. Military demining teams then spent nearly four years clearing more than 50,000 mines and explosive devices planted by the Houthis in and around Midi, including 52 naval mines. Local residents have only recently been allowed to return to the recreation area that once provided hundreds of jobs.[33]

Today, the Yemeni people are the biggest losers in the ongoing battle to control the coastlines and ports that belong to them as a national asset and should be contributing to a prosperous and thriving Yemen. Throughout the war Houthi mines and Saudi airstrikes have endangered the lives and livelihoods of Yemeni fishing communities, while decisions and regulations imposed by all of the warring parties have caused major delays at Yemen’s ports and doubled the costs of importing critical products—costs which traders transfer to Yemen’s most vulnerable to compensate for their losses. If high import costs can be reduced at Yemen’s ports, prices will drop for Yemeni consumers, and they will be able to purchase what they need to survive. This remains essential to preventing the greatest famine of the 21^st century while most Yemenis have little to no income and humanitarian aid is decreasing. Meanwhile, improving conditions at Yemen’s ports and overall economic opportunities for the Yemeni people will undermine the ideology of extremist groups like AQAP seeking to gain a foothold in Yemeni hearts and minds that they can use to launch attacks on the West. Thus, finding the political will to begin administrating Yemen’s ports for the welfare and autonomy of the Yemeni people—rather than for the unilateral advantage of global powers and their partisan proxies—could have a meaningful impact on the future of the global marketplace. According to one of the earliest coffee origin stories, a Sufi monk in Yemen brewed the world’s first cup of coffee more than 600 years ago. The potent elixir was delivered to the world from Yemeni ports[34] and impacts daily routines around the globe today. Waking up to the importance of Yemen’s ports past and present could matter more to your own future than you might think.[35]

[1] https://thehill.com/policy/international/4141596-more-than-3000-us-troops-reach-red-sea-amid-iran-tensions/?ref=readtangle.com

[2] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/yemen-houthis-iran-revolution-sanctions/

[3] https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/jan-feb-2023/19711

[4] https://www.newarab.com/analysis/battle-control-yemens-ports

[5] https://dawnmena.org/the-uaes-expansionist-agenda-in-yemen-is-playing-out-on-socotra/

[6] https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/undp-support-vital-hodeidah-ports-sets-pace-sustainable-peace-yemen

[7] https://sanaacenter.org/the-yemen-review/jan-feb-2023/19711

[8] https://www.earth.com/image/extinct-volcano-aden-yemen/

[9] https://www.portofaden.net/en/site/page/5/History

[10] https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Baabood_Yemen.pdf

[11] http://wikimapia.org/10949775/Port-of-Qana

[12] https://medomed.org/featured_item/the-cultural-landscape-of-balhaf-oasis-and-the-burum-coastal-area-yemen/